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The increasing occurrence of national, regional, and global financial crises, together with their 
rising costs and complexity, have increased calls for greater regional and global monetary 
cooperation. This is particularly necessary in light of volatile capital flow movements that can 
quickly transmit crisis developments in individual countries to other countries around the world. 
Global financial safety nets (GFSNs) are one important area for monetary cooperation. This 
paper reviews the current situation of regional and global monetary cooperation, focusing on 
financial safety nets, with a view toward developing recommendations for more effective 
cooperation, especially between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and regional financial 
arrangements (RFAs). 
A GFSN should have adequate resources to deal with multiple crises, should be capable of 
rapid and flexible response, and should not be encumbered by historical impediments such as 
the IMF stigma that would limit its acceptance by recipient countries. Oversight of a  GFSN 
needs to be based on cooperation between global and regional forums, for example, the G20 
and ASEAN+3 or East Asia Summit (EAS). Such a GFSN should include the IMF and RFAs at a 
minimum, and it is highly recommended to find ways to include central banks as providers of 
swap lines and multilateral banks as well. The basic principles governing the cooperation of IMF 
and RFAs include rigorous and even-handed surveillance; respect of independence and 
decision-making processes of each institution and regional specificities; ongoing collaboration 
as a way to build regional capacity for crisis prevention; open sharing of information and joint 
missions where necessary; specialization based on comparative advantage; consistency of 
lending conditions and conditionality, although with flexibility; respect of the IMF as preferred 
creditor; subsidiarity; avoidance of moral hazard; and transparency. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The increasing occurrence of national, regional, and global financial crises, together with their 
rising costs and complexity, have increased calls for greater regional and global monetary 
cooperation. This is particularly necessary in light of volatile capital flow movements, which can 
quickly transmit crisis developments in individual countries to other countries around the world. 
Global financial safety nets (GFSNs) are  one important area for monetary cooperation. The 
Group of Twenty (G20) Cannes summit final declaration noted that: 
As a contribution to a more structured approach, we agreed to further strengthen global 
financial safety nets in which national governments, central banks, regional financial 
arrangements and international financial institutions will each play a role according to and 
within their respective mandate…We agreed on common principles for cooperation between 
the IMF and Regional Financial Arrangements, which will strengthen crisis prevention and 
resolution efforts. (G20 Secretariat 2011a: 3) 
Other potential areas for cooperation include “international harmonization of supervision and 
regulation as well as crisis prevention, management, and resolution” (Kawai 2009a: 6). In 
particular, the disruptive effects of volatile international capital flows call for a coordinated 
approach to global supervision and management of such risks. 
This paper reviews the current situation of regional and global monetary cooperation, focusing 
on financial safety nets, with a view toward developing recommendations for more effective 
cooperation, especially between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and regional financial 
arrangements (RFAs). Section 2 describes the reasons for international monetary cooperation 
and the basic principles that should guide it. Section 3 describes the background and recent 
experience of international monetary cooperation. Section 4 describes major cooperation 
issues. Section 5 provides some suggestions for alternative arrangements for cooperation, and 
section 6 concludes. 
2.  REASONS FOR AND PRINCIPLES OF REGIONAL AND 
GLOBAL MONETARY COOPERATION 
2.1  Reasons for cooperation 
Major reasons for regional and global monetary cooperation include scale, the need to avoid 
forum shopping and duplication, gains from specialization, and legacy issues, especially the so-
called “legitimacy deficit” or “stigma” of the IMF. 
Scale: With the rise in the frequency and severity of financial crises, the expansion in the size 
and number of regional financial arrangements, and the increase over the last decade in the 
level of international reserves that can be placed at the disposal of bilateral and regional 
facilities, the necessity and complexity of coordinating these facilities with the IMF has increased 
dramatically.  ADB  and IIE (2011) argue that it is unrealistic to expect a single institution to 
manage such developments at the global level. Particularly in the case of regional contagion, 
demands for funds can increase rapidly. The case of southern Europe and Ireland is the most 
recent and largest example of this. As will be described in more detail below, very few national 
governments have been content to rely solely on the IMF for balance of payments and other 
official financing. Many large countries have engaged or contributed to bilateral, regional, and ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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plurilateral financial facilities as well, including members with substantial influence in the IMF, 
such as the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, and Japan.  
The scale of most regional facilities is still relatively small. The Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (CMIM)—the world’s second largest regional facility after the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)—totals $120 billion
1
The possible provision of currency swap lines by central banks of reserve currency countries 
potentially changes the equation for lending, because of the ability of such banks to print 
unlimited amounts of their currencies. Theoretically, the CMIM, for example, could borrow any 
amount  from  the Bank of Japan, and therefore would not need to cooperate with the IMF. 
However, as will be explained below, there are many practical obstacles and limitations to this 
possibility. Moreover, this would not obviate the need for cooperation in surveillance activity. 
. However, the borrowing limits for 
individual ASEAN members of the CMIM (those most likely to make use of the facility) are only 
about $12.5 billion at most, and only 20% of that is accessible without an IMF program. Other 
regional facilities, such as the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) and the Latin American Reserve 
Fund (FLAR) are much smaller, both less than $3 billion total. 
Reduce forum shopping: The existence of multiple sources of funding makes it possible for 
borrowing countries to  “shop” for the easiest borrowing conditions leading to institutional 
arbitrage, thereby undermining the effectiveness of surveillance. However, as discussed in more 
detail below, there will be a strong incentive to offer consistent conditionality among cooperating 
safety nets, given the need for cooperation in the face of large borrowing requirements. 
Reduce duplication or cancelling out: Existence of multiple facilities can lead to wasteful 
duplication. Even worse, on the other hand they could lead to cancelling out of facilities, where 
the opening of one credit line leads to another being closed.  These potential problems 
underscore the need for cooperation between regional and global safety nets. 
Mutual gains from division of labor and specialization along lines of comparative 
advantage:  Global and regional institutions may bring different strengths and weaknesses, 
offering room for specialization to comparative advantage. The IMF clearly dominates in terms 
of the amount of resources available for both surveillance and financial assistance, but may lack 
local knowledge and/or legitimacy. The case of the IMF stigma in Asia (and Latin America) is a 
major example of where countries would be extremely reluctant to rely on IMF funding and 
programs if this was not made palatable by coordination with a regional facility. On the other 
hand, the regional entity may lack sufficient resources, both in terms of staff and reserves, 
particularly if more than one country in the region is hit as a result of contagion (Glick and Rose 
1998, Eichengreen 2006, Park and Wyplosz 2008). Some scholars, for example, Takagi (2010), 
argue that regional groupings have greater ability to apply peer pressure to members, but others 
are skeptical. 
Need for general improvement of international financial architecture: There is a 
widespread view that the current international monetary system, centered on the IMF and the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB), failed in its basic mission in the run-up to the global financial 
crisis. Camdessus et al. (2011) notes that the IMF, as the central institution of the system, has 
suffered from a “legitimacy deficit”, reflecting both the underrepresentation of some emerging 
market and developing countries, and the failure of the IMF’s peer review process to have much 
influence over the policies of its largest members. Fernández-Arias and Levy-Yeyati  (2010) 
argue that the IMF’s lending facilities were not sufficiently effective during the global financial 
                                                 
1 In this paper, $ refers to US dollars. 
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crisis. Goldstein (2010) argues that IMF surveillance of the People’s Republic of China’s (the 
PRC) currency policy was ineffectual. Cho (2011) and Park and Wyplosz (2008) assert that the 
IMF, as a key institution of the international monetary system (IMS), has not played an effective 
role in the surveillance or management of the global economy and financial market. Kawai 
(2009a: 5) concludes: 
[T]hey failed to detect the buildup of systemic risk in the US, the UK, and the eurozone, send 
clear warnings to policymakers, and provide policy advice on measures to reduce the risk. 
These organizations clearly underestimated the looming risk in the shadow banking system, 
interconnections across financial firms, markets, and countries and global macroeconomic–
financial links. 
Schinasi and Truman (2010) argue that the global financial architecture was not effective in 
encouraging or persuading remedial actions at the national, regional, continental, or global level 
until a full-scale global systemic crisis was a reality to be dealt with. They are similarly critical of 
the role of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF, the predecessor of the FSB) in the period prior to 
the global crisis, although it must be said that FSF staff were some of the most vocal in terms of 
warning about the buildup of systemic risks prior to the crisis. 
2.2  Key principles of regional and global cooperation 
Recognizing the need for increased cooperation between the IMF and RFAs, the G20 member 
countries have agreed on the following six principles for cooperation: 
1. An enhanced cooperation between RFAs and the IMF would be a step forward towards 
better crisis prevention, more effective crisis resolution and would reduce moral hazard. 
Cooperation between RFAs and the IMF should foster rigorous and even-handed surveillance 
and promote the common goals of regional and global financial and monetary stability.  
2. Cooperation should respect the roles, independence and decision-making processes of 
each institution, taking into account regional specificities in a flexible manner.  
3. While cooperation between RFAs and the IMF may be triggered by a crisis, ongoing 
collaboration should be promoted as a way to build regional capacity for crisis prevention.  
4. Cooperation should commence as early as possible and include open sharing of 
information and joint missions where necessary. It is clear that each institution has 
comparative advantages and would benefit from the expertise of the other. Specifically, RFAs 
have better understanding of regional circumstances and the IMF has a greater global 
surveillance capacity.  
5. Consistency of lending conditions should be sought to the extent possible, in order to 
prevent arbitrage and facility shopping, in particular as concerns policy conditions and facility 
pricing. However, some flexibility would be needed as regards adjustments to conditionality, if 
necessary, and on the timing of the reviews. In addition, definitive decisions about financial 
assistance within a joint programme should be taken by the respective institutions 
participating in the programme.  
6. RFAs must respect the preferred creditor status of the IMF. (G20 Secretariat 2011b) 
Principle  3 is important  because it highlights the need for greater pre-crisis planning and 
institutionalization of cooperation. Such cooperation and coordination should start as early as 
possible. The emphasis on the role of the IMF in regional capacity building is also positive. 
Principle  4 highlights the needs for information sharing and specialization according to 
comparative advantage, which will be discussed further in Section 5 below. Principle  5 ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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regarding consistency of lending conditionality to reduce forum shopping is crucially important. 
As discussed in Section 5 below, we believe that Principles 4 and 5 will impose significant limits 
on the ability of RFAs to be truly independent from the IMF. Principle 6 means that the IMF gets 
priority in terms of loan repayment relative to sovereign lenders. 
Some additional principles that we believe should be included are subsidiarity, avoidance of 
moral hazard,  and transparency. The principle of subsidiarity suggests that government 
activities should be devolved to the lowest level that is capable of handling them. This is on the 
grounds that the lower-level entity has greater local knowledge and fewer potential conflicts of 
interest. Subsidiarity is one of the general principles of the European Union Law. Using the 
approach of club theory, Kawai, Petri, and Sisli-Ciamarra (2009) argue for a “decentralized” 
approach to coordination of global and regional institutions, where activity is shifted from the 
global to the sub-global level where feasible. Regarding the IMF, such decentralization could 
include institutionalization of the involvement of regional and national co-lenders, strengthening 
those regional institutions, and expanding cooperation in surveillance. 
Moral hazard arises when the existence of insurance may lead a country to take riskier policies 
than it would otherwise, since it is assured of being bailed out of difficulties. The main way to 
avoid moral hazard is through surveillance and conditionality (Eichengreen 2006). This strongly 
suggests the need to coordinate surveillance standards and loan conditionality to minimize 
moral hazard in the presence of multiple insurance institutions. However, countries may resist 
conditionality if other options are available, such as swap agreements. Perhaps two cases need 
to be distinguished: (i) a country experiences a liquidity squeeze because of inappropriate 
policies that require a structural adjustment program; and (ii) a country experiences a liquidity 
squeeze as an “innocent bystander”, as a result of, for example, stresses elsewhere that result 
in large-scale capital outflows from that country. Conditionality would be appropriate in the first 
case but not in the second.  
The basis for surveillance is gradually becoming more transparent, partly as a result of pressure 
from the G20 countries for a more consistent approach. Other areas that require further 
improvements in transparency include prequalification for lending and coordination activities. 
Finally, it should be noted that the principles quoted above only refer to cooperation between 
the IMF and RFAs, and do not refer to other possible cooperating entities, that is, central banks 
and multilateral banks. As will be seen, a broad-based and effective GSFN requires their 
participation as well. 
3.  STATUS OF COOPERATION OF REGIONAL AND GLOBAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
This section describes the current major global and regional institutions concerned with the 
international monetary system, as well as some of the major recent cooperation episodes. 
Global and regional entities involved in surveillance and stabilization lending are summarized in 
Table 1. The table shows that most but not all entities conduct both surveillance and lending 
activities. ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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Table 1: Global and Regional Entities Involved in International Monetary Cooperation 
Institution Surveillance Lending
Global
International Monetary Fund X X
Bank for International Settlements-FSB X
Regional
EU Commission X X
EU Balance of Payments Facility X
European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) X
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) X
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization X X
ASEAN+3 ERPD X
Asian Development Bank X X
Arab Monetary Fund X
Latin American Reserve Fund X X
North American Framework Agreement X X  
ASEAN=Association of Southeast Asian Nations; ASEAN+3=ASEAN members plus the People’s Republic of China, 
Japan, and Korea; ERPD=Economic Review and Policy Dialogue; EU=European Union; FSB=Financial Stability Board. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
3.1  Global and regional institutions and their roles 
Global level: The IMF has had prime responsibility for both surveillance and lending activity 
within the international monetary system. Its role in these activities has been increasingly 
formalized over time, as a result of crisis experiences and pressures from international bodies. 
The IMF is still unique among crisis-fighting facilities in the universality and diversity of its 
membership, and remains the final resort in efforts to combat national and regionwide systemic 
financial crises. Whereas an  RFA can turn to the IMF if the former’s operation alone is 
considered inadequate, there is no similar fallback among international financial facilities (ADB 
and IIE 2011). 
The IMF’s surveillance activity is massive. In  terms of human resources alone, the IMF is 
estimated to have devoted over 1,100 staff years to surveillance activities in fiscal year (FY) 
2005, which is the last year for which such numbers are publicly available. Given the additional 
expenditures associated with surveillance, the total financial cost of IMF surveillance activities is 
likely to total hundreds of millions of US dollars per year (Takagi 2010).  
The IMF’s main surveillance mechanism is the bilateral consultation process it conducts with 
members, usually once a year, under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. There are 
two other surveillance mechanisms. One is through multilateral discussions held in the context 
of twice-yearly World Economic Outlook reviews by the IMF  Executive Board. The other is 
through IMF lending programs to support adjustment in member countries, although this is 
usually referred to as conditionality. An important aspect of IMF surveillance pursued in 
collaboration with the World Bank is the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). This 
program aims to increase the effectiveness of efforts to promote the soundness of financial 
systems in member countries. 
On the lending side, the IMF’s lending capacity was tripled to $750 billion as a result of a G20 
agreement in April 2009, plus a general allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) totaling 
$250 billion, and the introduction of two new lending facilities—the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) 
and the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) that provide member countries access to financing ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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(with some conditionality in the case of the PCL) for crisis prevention, rather than crisis 
resolution (ADB and IIE 2011)
2
Nevertheless, the resources available to the IMF are still far smaller than current global capital 
flows, and are a small fraction of total foreign reserves held by emerging market economies.  
.  
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is also involved in international monetary 
cooperation and surveillance by virtue of its role in assisting central banks and other financial 
authorities in their efforts to promote greater monetary and financial stability; and acting as a 
bank, almost exclusively for central banks. In particular, it provides a forum to promote 
discussion and facilitate decision  making among central banks and within the international 
financial and supervisory community. The meetings of governors and senior officials of member 
central banks that are held every two months represent the primary instrument through which 
the BIS seeks to promote international financial cooperation (Lamberte 2005). Various 
committees tied to the BIS also perform important roles in monetary cooperation. The 
Committee on the Global Financial System is a central bank forum with a mandate to identify 
and assess potential sources of stress in global financial markets, to further the understanding 
of the functioning and underpinnings of financial markets, and to promote the development of 
well functioning and stable financial markets. The FSB, whose secretariat is based at the BIS, 
promotes international financial stability through enhanced information exchange and 
cooperation in financial supervision and surveillance. Unlike the IMF, the BIS does not provide 
loan support to countries. 
Since 2007, the G20 has assumed the primary role of coordinating global economic and 
financial policies, including providing guidance to the IMF and the FSB. The members of the 
G20 account for about 85% of world GDP (in purchasing power parity terms) and about 65% of 
the world’s population. They also hold 65.8% of the quotas and 64.7% of the votes of the IMF. 
Moreover, almost all of them participate in a bilateral or regional financial arrangements. One 
member, the European Union, is itself a regional organization that operates several financial 
arrangements which are described below.  
Since the G20 membership includes major emerging economies that at times have been the 
recipients of IMF programs and policies, or at least been recipients of IMF criticism, the G20 has 
been instrumental in pushing for broad-based reforms of the IMF, including its governance, 
voting shares, surveillance activity, and lending activity. As noted above, the Seoul Summit 
gave the G20 a broader mandate to strengthen GFSNs. Work on the GFSNs is currently being 
steered in the G20 by a Financial Safety Nets Experts Group, co-chaired by Korea and the UK 
(ADB and IIE 2011). 
The G20 finance ministers and central bank governors agreed to strengthen the international 
monetary system by focusing their work in the short term on assessing developments in global 
liquidity, developing an improved toolkit to strengthen the GFSNs, enhancing cooperation 
between the IMF and regional financial arrangements, and strengthening the effectiveness and 
coherence of bilateral and multilateral IMF surveillance, among others (ADB and IIE 2011). 
One major product of G20 activity has been the development of the Mutual Assessment 
Process (MAP) that is aimed at both identifying areas of international systemic risk and putting 
pressure on members to take corrective actions to reduce those risk factors.
3
                                                 
2 More recent developments in IMF lending programs are discussed below in section 3.2. 
 All G20 member 
countries are subject to this assessment process. This mutual assessment of macroeconomic 
policies represents the first instance of multilateral surveillance on a global scale in recent 
history (Cho 2011: 10). This is a response to the perception that the IMF was not even-handed 
3 See IMF 2011 for a detailed description. ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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in its approach to analyzing risks in the major advanced economies as compared with emerging 
economies. The IMF provides technical assistance to the MAP, but this is separate from the 
IMF’s own bilateral and multi-lateral surveillance processes. 
The MAP has been further strengthened through improvements in the IMF’s surveillance 
activities. Shortly after the onset of the global financial crisis, the G20 tasked the IMF and the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) to collaborate on regular early warning exercises (EWEs). EWEs 
have since become firmly established, and now provide timely information on high impact risks 
to the global economy (ADB and IIE 2011). In surveillance, the biggest challenge lies in 
strengthening the MAP as a framework of global policy dialogue and cooperation to deal with 
policy spillovers. The G20 needs to support the establishment of a stronger peer review process 
that will “discipline” countries and make them internalize policy spillovers (ADB and IIE 2011). 
As described in section 3.2, the World Bank has also  played a role in international bailout 
programs, although this has been much more limited than that of the IMF, as it is not part of the 
World Bank’s major mission. 
Regional level: Table 2 summarizes the features of the major regional financial arrangements, 
including their contributing members, stated purpose, size of reserves, and relationship with the 
IMF.  ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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Table 2: Relation between Selected Regional Financial Arrangements and the IMF 
Name of fund Contributing members Purpose Size Relationship to the IMF
EU Balance of PaymentsAll EU members Medium-term financial €50 bn Not formally linked
Facility assistance for non-euro to IMF programs, but
members of the organized jointly in
European Union recent cases; members
obliged to consult EU
before approaching IMF
European Financial All EU members To address severe €60 bn Not legally linked to IMF
Stabilization Mechanism disturbances beyond programs, but linked
(EFSM) members’ control; as a matter of Council
available to all EU policy
members
European Financial All members of the euroPreserve financial €440 bn Not legally linked to IMF
Stability Facility (EFSF)* area stability of monetary programs, but linked
union via temporary as a matter of Council
financial assistance to policy and members’




Chiang Mai Initiative Ten member states Address balance $120 bn Beyond 20 percent of
Multilateralization (CMIMof ASEAN plus PRC, of payments and a country’s allotment,
Japan, Korea, and short-term liquidity disbursements must
Hong Kong, China difficulties; supplement be linked to an IMF
existing international program; not yet
financial arrangements activated
Arab Monetary Fund Twenty-two Arab Broad, including $2.7 bn Ordinary loans are
countries in North Africacorrecting payments usually accompanied by
and the Middle East disequilibria and an IMF program; other
currency instability, types of assistance are
through short- and not necessarily linked
medium-term credit
facilities
Latin American Reserve Bolivia, Colombia, Support members’ $2.34 bn No role for the IMF
Fund Ecuador, Costa Rica, balance of payments
Peru, Uruguay, and with credits and
Venezuela guarantees
North American United States, Canada,Provide short-term $9 bn US Treasury requires
Framework Agreement and Mexico liquidity support letter from IMF
through 90-day central managing director
bank swaps, renewable
up to one year  
*The EFSF will be superseded by the establishment of a permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with a lending 
capacity of €500 billion in July 2012, although both will coexist for some time as existing EFSF programs are wound down 
(European Commission 2012).  
bn=billion; EU=European Union; IMF=International Monetary Fund; PRC=People’s Republic of China; US=United States. 
Source: Henning (2011). 
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European institutions, including the EU Balance of Payments Facility (EUBPF), the European 
Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
collectively have by far the biggest resources among RFAs. The EUBPF was created in 1988, 
and the EFSM and the EFSF are much more recent, having been created in 2010 in response 
to the sovereign debt crises in a number of European countries. The former two can be 
accessed by any EU member, while the last is available only to euro area members. None of 
these programs are legally linked to IMF programs, but all EU programs have conditionality and 
are linked to IMF programs as a matter of policy. In the case of the EUBPF, members are 
obliged to consult with the EUBPF first before approaching the IMF.  
After the European institutions, the second largest regional entity is the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (CMIM), which includes the 10 member countries of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
4
Several other bodies in Asia also have surveillance responsibilities, including the Economic 
Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) under ASEAN+3, the ASEAN Integration Monitoring Office 
(AIMO) within the ASEAN Secretariat, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). ADB’s Office of 
Regional Integration has 21 staff working to support ERPD-related activities. It remains to be 
seen how the AMRO will interact with these other bodies. Currently the AIMO has a professional 
staff of four, and total required staffing of 10 economists depending on budget availability. 
AIMO's mandate is to monitor regional economic integration while AMRO is doing IMF-style 
macroeconomic surveillance. 
 and the People’s Republic of China (the PRC), Japan, and 
the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea), known collectively as ASEAN+3. It was originally 
formed as a set of bilateral swap agreements in 2001 in the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis, and then was expanded to a multilateral pooling arrangement in 2009. Unlike the 
European regional arrangements, it has a formal link with the IMF, as members must have an 
IMF program in order to borrow beyond 20% of their borrowing limit. In 2011, the ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) was established in Singapore as a formal surveillance 
unit for the CMIM. However, its scale is small, with only 12 professional staff in early 2012, and 
expected to increase to 20 by the end of 2012. 
The Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), founded in 1976, includes 22 member countries in North Africa 
and the Middle East. It has a broad mandate including not only assistance in balance of 
payments adjustment but also wider monetary cooperation and paving the way for a unified 
Arab currency (AMF 2011). Total funding is $2.7 billion. Ordinary loans are usually 
accompanied by an IMF program, and it does not appear to have its own macroeconomic 
surveillance activity. 
The Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) is a common reserve fund that seeks the stability of 
member countries by improving their external position and strengthening regional support. The 
FLAR was established in 1978. Member countries include Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The objectives of the FLAR are: 
  Support the balance of payments of member countries by granting loans or guaranteeing 
third-party loans.  
  Improve the conditions of international reserve investments made by member countries.  
  Contribute to the harmonization of exchange rate, monetary, and financial policies of 
member countries (FLAR 2011). 
                                                 
4 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The CMIM also includes Hong Kong, China. ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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Total funding of the FLAR is about $2.34 billion. There is no role for the IMF, and the FLAR 
does have its own regular surveillance activity of member countries.  
The North American Framework Agreement (NAFA) comprising the United States (US), 
Canada, and Mexico was established in 1994. Total funding is US$9 billion, and the US 
Treasury requires a letter from the IMF managing director to activate cooperation with the IMF. 
The most salient difference between the European institutions, the CMIM, and the NAFA versus 
the AMF and the FLAR is that the former RFAs include large reserve-currency economies as 
members, while the latter do not. Therefore, in theory at least, the members of the former 
groups could obtain unlimited amounts of reserve currencies via swap agreements from 
member reserve-currency central bank or banks, while the latter cannot. This highlights two 
important points: (i) the need to include the role of reserve-currency banks in the discussion of 
regional and global monetary cooperation; and (ii) the need to understand the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of all three categories of participants in international monetary cooperation. 
3.2  Financial safety nets’ cooperation experience 
This section describes the recent experience of regional and global cooperation for financial 
safety nets and summarizes some major lessons from this experience. In some cases, the 
absence of cooperation provides significant information as well. Table 3 summarizes the major 
episodes of joint programs by global institutions (mainly the IMF) and regional financial facilities 
since 1997. Strikingly, among major episodes, only the experiences of Europe included the 
participation of one of the RFAs.
5 As a result of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the 
ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Europe, there have been programs for Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, and Romania.
6
                                                 
5 The AMF has also cooperated with the IMF, as will be discussed below, but the amounts have been small in 
comparison. 
 Notably, the program for Ireland included contributions 
from  a number of individual European governments as well, while those for Greece and 
Hungary also included contributions from the World Bank. For Greece, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) provided technical support rather than direct contributions, although it has also 
been active in buying Greek government bonds in the secondary market. 
6 The programs for Hungary, Latvia, and Romania were under the Balance of Payments Adjustment Program. ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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Table 3: Joint Programs of Global and Regional Institutions, 1997–2011 
Country Global Institution Regional Facility Other Total
Portugal 2011 IMF: €26 bn EFSM: €26 bn €78 bn
EFSF: €26 bn
Ireland 2010 IMF: €22.5 bn EFSM: €22.5 bn National contribution:  €85 bn
EFSF: €22.5 bn  Ireland Treasury, Pension: €17.5 bn
Greece 2010 IMF: €30 bn EU: €80 bn ECB: provides technical support €110 bn
Romania 2009 IMF: €13 bn EC: €5 bn €20 bn
Others: €2 bn
Latvia 2008 IMF: €1.68 bn EU: €3.1 bn Other central banks: €1.9 bn €7.5 bn
World Bank: €0.4 bn Others: €0.4 bn
Hungary 2008 IMF: €12.5 bn EC: €6.5 bn  €20 bn
World Bank: €1.0 bn
Brazil 1998 IMF: $18.1bn IDB: $4.5 bn Bilateral guarantees of BIS credits: $41.5 bn
World Bank: $4.5 bn $14.5 bn
Indonesia IMF: $15 bn ADB: $4.5 bn Japan: $5.0 bn $49 bn
World Bank: $5.5 bn Others: $19 bn
Korea 1997 IMF: $21 bn ADB: $4.015 bn Japan: $10 bn $55 bn
World Bank: $10 bn
Thailand 1997 IMF: $3.9 bn ADB: $1.2 bn Bilateral loans: Japan, $4 bn; $17.2 bn
World Bank: $1.5 bn Others: $1 bn–500 mn each
 
ADB=Asian Development Bank; BIS=Bank for International Settlements; bn=billion; ECB=European Central Bank; EFSF= 
European Financial Stability Facility; EFSM= European Financial Stabilization Mechanism; EU=European Union; 
IDB=Inter-American Development Bank; IMF=International Monetary Fund; mn=million; US=United States. 
Source: Adapted from EC (2011), Henning (2011), IMF (2000), Radelet and Sachs (1998). 
The Latvian program is particularly interesting because it is a case where the IMF disagreed 
with the regional partner about the program, the European Union, yet the conflict was 
successfully resolved (Henning 2011). The IMF had originally proposed currency devaluation as 
part of the program, but the European Union resisted this, since Latvia was a candidate for euro 
membership. The IMF eventually agreed to a more stringent program that was not accompanied 
by currency devaluation. 
None of the other four cases in Table 3—Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand—involved any 
of the regional facilities described in the previous section. The reasons are simple—the CMIM 
did not exist at that time, and Brazil is not a member of the FLAR. Instead, in all four cases there 
was significant participation by the relevant multilateral bank—the Asian Development Bank or 
the Inter-American Development Bank. This highlights another important point—multilateral 
banks also need to be included in the discussion of regional and global monetary cooperation. 
The experiences of Europe provide two broad lessons. “First, the region with the best-
developed regional institutions, including a common currency and elaborate regional 
surveillance mechanism, was not sufficiently equipped to deal with a major financial emergency 
among one of its member governments.” (Henning 2011: 6) 
The ad hoc nature of cooperation between the IMF and the European Union has been risky on a 
number of fronts. For example, the crisis highlighted the fact that there is no institutional 
mechanism for the IMF to commit itself in advance to a hypothetical contingency, much less one 
of such an unprecedented magnitude (Henning 2011). Also, the IMF had no formal mechanism 
for negotiating directly with the European Commission. Historically, the process of IMF–EU ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
 
 
  14 
interaction has been complicated. The executive director of the country holding the chair of the 
Eurogroup (euro area member countries) represents the euro area countries at the IMF, while 
the Economic and Financial Committee’s Sub-Committee on the International Monetary Fund 
(SCIMF) is responsible for coordinating EU policy on IMF business from Brussels. The SCIMF 
alone includes over 60 officials and operates on the basis of consensus. The informal “EURIMF” 
body facilitates exchanges of views in Washington, DC between IMF executive directors and 
alternate directors from EU member states, the ECB’s observer to the IMF, and an official from 
the EU Delegation to the US. (Hodson 2011). 
The system worked relatively smoothly when the rescue package for Romania was arranged in 
October 2008 between the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank. Moreover, the EU was able to 
retain a say over the conditions attached to the overall package and the assessments of its 
implementation (Hodson 2011). The EU also moved quickly during the financial crisis to 
coordinate international efforts to support Latvia and Romania. However, unlike the cases of 
Hungary, Latvia, and Romania, the political processes of the European Union led to significant 
indecision and hesitation regarding policies on euro area states such as Greece. In particular, 
there was (and is) much local political resistance to large bailouts and international fiscal 
transfers, as well as to a full lender-of-last-resort role for the European Central Bank. For 
example, it took three months of haggling between member countries before the terms of a 
rescue package for Greece were finally agreed on, and these difficulties continued in 
negotiating later packages as well. This suggests that the basic problem of political coordination 
among the EU members is a bigger issue than the specific mode of coordination with the IMF. 
This has important implications for other RFAs such as the CMIM. 
Second, despite the above points, the IMF–EU relation has been relatively close, and may not 
be easily transferrable to other regional institutions (Henning 2011, ADB and IIE 2011). This 
reflects, among others, the strong European orientation of the leadership and staff of the IMF 
and the lack of a historical IMF stigma problem in Europe. There is a broad perception, certainly 
among Asian countries,  that IMF programs for European economies were significantly less 
stringent and more narrowly focused than those imposed on Asian economies during the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–1998. 
There have been numerous instances of joint lending by the IMF and the AMF to AMF member 
countries. As mentioned above, AMF ordinary loans are usually accompanied by IMF programs. 
It would be interesting to identify the reasons for this difference in cooperation behavior. It may 
have  reflected the lack of the AMF resources to conduct its  own surveillance activity. This 
pattern strongly suggests that, for whatever reason, the IMF stigma has not been an important 
factor in this region. Perhaps closeness to Europe is the most obvious reason. 
In contrast, the most obvious feature about Asia during the global financial crisis was the lack of 
involvement of either the IMF or the CMIM. Two countries experienced significant difficulties 
arising from shortages of foreign exchange—Korea and Indonesia. However, both ended up 
resorting instead to bilateral swap agreements with central banks or other arrangements. Korea 
obtained a $30 billion swap agreement with the US Federal Reserve (Fed), while Indonesia 
secured a $5.5 billion “standby loan facility”—or “deferred drawdown options”—from Japan ($1 
billion), Australia ($1 billion), ADB ($1.5 billion), and the World Bank ($2 billion) in 2009 (Kawai 
2009b).
7
                                                 
7 Singapore also obtained a $30 billion swap agreement with the Fed, but never drew on it. 
 The key reason appears to be the IMF stigma and the continuing linkage of the CMIM 
with an IMF program. The IMF stigma remains so strong in Asia (and Latin America) that it is 
considered politically unacceptable to go the IMF unless all other options have been exhausted. ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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There appears to have been no instance of joint lending by the IMF and the FLAR. In years 
when member countries had IMF programs, they did not borrow from the FLAR, and vice versa. 
Thus, loans from the IMF and the FLAR appear historically to have been substitutes rather than 
complementary, an unsatisfactory situation that  also may be a reflection of an IMF stigma 
problem.  
The recent experiences of regional and global lending programs have sparked debate on a 
number of other issues, including the need for an international lender of last resort, the need for 
precautionary lending facilities, the need for prequalification and reduced conditionality for 
qualified borrowers to allow rapid disbursement, the need for a broader array of instruments, 
including swap arrangements and emergency SDR allocations, and the need for a more 
formalized multi-tier structure of a global financial safety net. For example, Camdessus et al. 
(2011: 12) proposed that: 
The IMF should work with relevant governments, central banks, and regional pools to put in 
place, with appropriate safeguards, permanent crisis financing mechanisms akin to a global 
lender of last resort.  
Such calls have been echoed by Eichengreen (2006) and Kawai (2009a) among others. 
The IMF has been rethinking its global crisis prevention programs, with two related issues in 
mind: the need for rapid disbursement without significant conditionality, encouraging a trend 
toward “preapproval-type” approaches based on the comprehensive assessment for 
prequalification, and the IMF stigma problem. This led to the development of the Flexible Credit 
Line (FCL), which offers pre-approved loans without conditionality to highly qualified borrowers, 
in 2009, and the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL), which offers pre-approved loans with limited 
conditionality to somewhat less qualified borrowers, in 2011. However, the response to these 
programs has been quite limited so far, suggesting that these have not solved the stigma 
problem. For example, so far only Colombia, Mexico, and Poland have applied for the FCL, and 
only Macedonia for the PCL.  
More ambitiously, the IMF is also studying the  establishment of a Global Stabilization 
Mechanism (GSM), with itself at the center of a network of central banks and regional financial 
arrangements.
8
Once the system is activated, the Board would have a number of options to provide and expand 
funding, including making unilateral offers to member countries; activating short-term liquidity 
instruments available only in systemic events; augmenting existing arrangements; modifying 
access limits; increasing access under the first credit tranche; coordination with central banks 
and multilateral institutions; augmentation of the Fund’s sources where judged necessary; and 
making a general SDR allocation (IMF 2010b). These measures could require substantial 
cooperation with central banks and multilateral institutions, but the details of such coordination, 
especially with regard to the availability of central bank swap lines, have not yet been spelled 
out. A key aspect is that the plan would extend the scope of prequalification by creating a new 
liquidity window (the Short-term Liquidity Line, or  SLL) without ex post conditionality, which 
would be available to some PCL-eligible countries during episodes of global distress. 
 The GSM would be specifically aimed at dealing with systemic crises that might 
affect a large number of countries simultaneously, requiring a rapid and relatively standardized 
approach fund disbursement. Such an approach would also reduce any stigma involved with 
countries being a “first mover” to apply for aid. The IMF Board would play a key role in the 
system, as the GSM would be activated after it made an assessment that a “systemic event” 
had taken place (IMF 2010b). 
                                                 
8 See IMF (2010b) for a description. ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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Nevertheless,  Fernández-Arias and Levy-Yeyati  (2010) point out that the plan entails 
considerable uncertainties, such as access to credit would still be decided by the IMF Executive 
Board, the criteria for the Executive Board to declare a systemic crisis are unclear; and the 
increased access to non-conditional liquidity by non-systemic countries would be limited. 
Access to such credit would still entail considerably more uncertainty than a country having its 
own reserves. 
Other proposals envisage somewhat different structures to attain the same ends. For example, 
(Camdessus et al. 2011: 12) proposes “…a single three-level architecture, ensuring universal 
representation through a system of constituencies, The Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors, taking strategic decisions related to the functioning of the international monetary 
system in the framework of a ‘Council’ as envisaged in the Fund’s Articles of Agreement.” The 
report also suggests that the BIS, the FSB, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World 
Bank,  and possibly other organizations should  be invited to meetings of the Council. Swap 
arrangements have also been proposed by Bénassy-Quéré, Pisani-Ferry, and Yu (2011), Cho 
(2011) and Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (2005). The government of the Republic of Korea made a 
proposal to the G20 for extending the system of official currency swaps on a more multilateral 
basis.  Fernández-Arias and Levy-Yeyati (2010) also argue that the IMF should be the core 
intermediary in an international network of swap lines. 
4.  COOPERATION ISSUES 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that both the G20’s and the IMF’s strategies for 
addressing systemic crises are evolving. Therefore any proposals for regional-global 
cooperation must take into account the likely evolution of both the G20’s and the IMF’s 
surveillance and crisis management frameworks. There are three major aspects of 
cooperation—pure coordination issues, surveillance, and financing activities. 
4.1  Pure coordination issues 
Pure coordination issues are those related to institutionalizing relationships and communications 
between the IMF, RFAs, multilateral banks, and national monetary authorities. (National finance 
ministries probably should be involved as well.) Traditionally, the IMF dealt only with individual 
countries, and does not have formal procedures for communicating with regional financial 
arrangements such as the CMIM. The arrangements with the European Union developed during 
the current European crisis only emerged in an ad hoc way.  
The IMF has begun to take concrete steps toward working more closely with regional financing 
arrangements (RFAs) in both surveillance and financing. In October 2010, the IMF hosted the 
first high-level meeting of RFAs, to start a dialogue on developing greater synergies with RFAs 
(ADB and IIE 2011, IMF 2010a). However, there is still a lack of formal relations/hierarchy 
between international agencies (Henning 2011). For example, no explicit arrangement for 
representation has been agreed among ASEAN+3 members; the IMF must engage with CMIM 
through its members, none of which is authorized by the group to speak for the region (ADB and 
IIE 2011). The IMF and other international finance institutions (IFIs) should provide mechanisms 
for facilitating and receiving the collective representation of the regional institutions. They should 
also consider allowing membership of regional organizations in the IMF (ADB and IIE 2011). 
Bini Smaghi (2004) proposed that the European Union should become an official member of the 
IMF, replacing the membership of its constituent states. This would of course raise issues about 
their voting powers in the IMF, governance, etc. ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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The IMF also needs to engage more with central banks and vice versa because of the close 
links and policy challenges in simultaneously achieving and safeguarding both macroeconomic 
and financial stability. However, Schinasi and Truman (2010) argue that such a division of labor 
is complicated by the fact that central banks tend not to want to be engaged with the IMF, and 
are reluctant in any institutional context to consider the global impact of their monetary policies 
on financial stability. 
4.2  Surveillance coordination 
The IMF does not have an official definition of what its surveillance activities include, but they 
have clearly expanded far beyond the initial remit of exchange rate and external balance 
policies. A recent IMF report accepts the extremely broad characterization of “…all aspects of 
the Fund’s analysis of, scrutiny over, and advice concerning, member countries’ economic 
situations, policies, and prospects” (IMF 2005: 3). 
There are ostensible gains to global and regional cooperation in surveillance. ADB and IIE 
(2011) propose joint surveillance among national, regional,  and global institutions. Global 
forums could identify issues that can lead to systemic failure, regional dialogues could forge 
common policies to ward off contagion,  and national surveillance could identify specific 
vulnerabilities in individual economies. This could become a three-tiered filtering mechanism for 
identifying emerging risks and vulnerabilities, and for achieving consensus on shared policy 
responses. In particular, a regional surveillance mechanism could strengthen channels of 
communication by taking a “bottom-up” approach to evaluation, with regional institutions playing 
the central role. The peer dialogue process would then draw on national and regional, rather 
than global, analyses. Last, but not least, such cooperation could help eliminate the IMF stigma 
problem. 
Nevertheless, such surveillance coordination entails many practical difficulties. The raison d’être 
of some RFAs is to provide an alternative to IMF surveillance and conditionality. However, as 
mentioned above, there is a huge imbalance between the surveillance resources and expertise 
at the IMF and those at RFAs. Second, in a serious crisis, it is unlikely that an RFA by itself 
could supply all the funding needed, particularly if multiple countries in the same group are hit 
because of contagion. In the absence of access to a sufficiently large central bank swap line, 
the RFA would be forced to call on the IMF for additional financing, which would make it difficult 
to overrule the IMF’s surveillance assessment. The only clear exception to this was Europe, 
where the funding provided by the European Union in the case of Latvia was greater than that of 
the IMF, and the European Commission was actually able to obtain agreement for stricter 
conditionality  than originally proposed by the IMF. Third, the increasing emphasis on 
precautionary lending facilities calls for a more standardized approach to ex ante classification 
of countries’ economic fundamentals and capacity to borrow. 
The literature on surveillance by RFAs shows a wide division of views. Proponents of 
independent surveillance by the CMIM include ADB and IIE (2011), Kawai (2009a) and Takagi 
(2010).  
With effective surveillance, the multilateralized CMI could rely more on its own judgment to 
make a lending decision, including both the amount and any conditionality, without creating 
moral hazard or raising concerns that the problems leading to balance of payments difficulties 
may be fundamental in nature. (Takagi 2010: 2) 
Takagi (2010) argues that East Asia needs its own mechanism because the region has a 
different objective for conducting surveillance than the IMF. East Asian authorities want to be 
able to make their own independent decisions with respect to the use of reserves pooled under ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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the CMIM. Takagi (2010) and ADB and IIE (2011) argue that peer pressure within a regional 
organizational structure is where regional surveillance potentially has the greatest advantage 
over global surveillance. When surveillance is undertaken by a regional institution that reports 
directly to key decision makers, the ability to exercise peer pressure in preventing crises could 
be considerably enhanced. Cho (2011) also notes that strengthened peer pressure could give 
the IMF‘s bilateral surveillance more bite.  
Nonetheless, even these authors recognize that it will take much work to raise the AMRO’s 
surveillance capacity to an adequate level. Kawai (2009a: 13) makes the following 
recommendations: 
  Clarify rules for activating CMIM lending; 
  Establish a joint forum for finance ministers and central bank governors to intensify policy 
dialogue among them; 
  Set up a strong professional secretariat, with the required analytical expertise and policy 
experience, to enable it to support regional economic surveillance (ERPD), 
  CMIM activation, and independent conditionality formulation; and 
  Move beyond the simple “information sharing” stage to a more rigorous “peer review and 
peer pressure” stage, and eventually to a “due diligence” stage, to improve the quality of 
economic surveillance. 
Takagi (2010) also notes that it would be critical that the surveillance unit be granted complete 
access to all surveillance outputs produced on the region’s economies by the IMF and other 
institutions. Even so, he concedes that “[f]inancial surveillance, though critical in assessing crisis 
vulnerability, is another area where duplication with global surveillance should be carefully 
avoided” (Takagi 2010: 9) because it is a labor-intensive activity that would drain the regional 
facility’s limited resources. This is a very significant concession, and would certainly limit the 
capacity of the regional body to come up with independent assessments of systemic financial 
risk. 
On the other hand, there are numerous skeptics about the capacity of RFAs to conduct 
independent surveillance. Eichengreen (2006) argues that peer monitoring is costly and subject 
to increasing returns; if scale economies are strong, there may be an argument for centralizing it 
at a global institution like the IMF. He also suggests that there are arguments for why 
responsibility for surveillance and conditionality should be delegated to an entity outside the 
region, such as the IMF, that is better capable of following time-consistent policies. Henning 
(2011) asserts that the AMRO will probably be too small to replicate the work of the IMF; and 
that a division of labor should be identified. He suggests that AMRO could…”(1) provide 
contrasting assessments of vulnerabilities within the region when the director and staff disagree 
with the findings of the IMF; (2) update assessments more frequently than the annual cycle for 
IMF Article IV consultations; (3) participate in surveillance discussions in which Asian officials 
might be more candid with one another than in the presence of IMF officials; and (4) otherwise 
provide a greater sense of Asian ownership (Henning 2011: 16).” 
Leaving these difficulties aside, there are some practical suggestions for increasing coordination 
between the IMF and regional groups. The participation of the IMF in the ASEAN+3 finance and 
central bank deputies’ process, as a regular policy dialogue partner, has proved to be quite 
useful and important. It could be equally useful if regional groups and entities could play a more 
direct role in the IMF surveillance process. For example, the IMF may invite staff from relevant 
regional organizations and groups to join the IMF’s annual Article IV consultation mission to 
regional member countries (Kawai 2009a: 15). However, it is important that joint surveillance not ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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weaken the IMF’s approach to surveillance. The independence of the institutions involved needs 
to be maintained. Also, to be effective, surveillance ultimately needs “strength” in terms of 
enforcement and coverage. 
Monitoring of capital flows is a vitally important aspect of coordinated surveillance, given the 
vulnerability of emerging economies to fluctuations on capital flows resulting from events that 
may take place far away. This would include coordination of macroprudential and capital flow 
management policies to minimize spill-over effects. 
Aside from the IMF, the other global body that needs to be liaised with in the area of systemic 
financial stability is the FSB. ADB President Kuroda (2008) proposed that Asian countries set up 
an Asian Financial Stability Dialogue (AFSD) to strengthen cross-border financial supervision 
and regulation at the regional level and further Asia’s financial stability, by developing effective 
early warning systems. The AFSD would be the regional equivalent of the FSB. This forum—to 
be created among finance ministries, central banks, and financial market regulators and 
supervisors—could also serve to promote longer-term financial market deepening and 
integration, establish standards for governance and transparency, and improve investor 
confidence. A close working relationship should also be established between the AFSD and the 
AMRO. Of course, these are moot points until the AFSD is actually established. 
4.3  Coordination of financing activity 
Similar to surveillance activity, coordination of financing activities  promises a number of 
potential gains, including most obviously greater financial resources and the potential of 
reducing the IMF stigma. ADB and IIE (2011) argue that the biggest challenge lies in addressing 
the stigma attached to IMF lending. Until it is resolved, efforts to increase IMF resources and 
improve its lending facilities will not amount to much, and countries will continue to rely on 
foreign reserves and bilateral swap agreements.  
Leaving aside the stigma issue, the experience during the European sovereign debt crisis 
shows that it is possible to arrange coordinated lending by the IMF and RFAs. Perhaps, the 
biggest challenge for such cooperation going forward is to address the above-mentioned shift in 
the IMF’s lending policy toward greater emphasis on prequalification and precautionary (pre-
crisis) lending. At the moment, the CMIM and other RFAs do not have such precautionary 
lending facilities or prequalification schemes. Therefore, developing these capabilities at the 
regional level appears to be important (although not absolutely necessary) for increased 
cooperation with the IMF going forward. 
The ASEAN+3 finance ministers recognized the desirability of establishing precautionary 
lending facilities at the 2011 Ha Noi meeting, noting that “…we instructed the Deputies to initiate 
a study on the design of a possible crisis prevention function for CMIM, including the size, 
further collaboration with the IMF, and the role of AMRO” (ASEAN Secretariat 2011). Kawai 
(2009b) proposes that CMIM support should be provided flexibly by (i) enabling precautionary 
lending rather than just crisis lending; (ii) delinking CMIM from IMF programs or requiring that no 
conditionality be imposed, in a way comparable to the IMF’s recently introduced Flexible Credit 
Line; and (iii) supplementing the CMIM by additional bilateral contributions, involving sufficiently 
large amounts, from economies inside and outside the region to make ample resources 
available for potential needs in the region.  
If the CMIM developed such facilities, the following issues would need to be examined: the 
financing mechanisms for such a facility; the conditions under which they would be triggered; 
conditions regarding the amount of funding available to member countries; and whether or not 
IMF funding would be required and the allocation of burden sharing (ADB and IIE 2011). ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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Henning (2011) notes that the IMF’s approach of offering different facilities to different 
categories of countries—“tiering”—has important implications for the solidarity of ASEAN+3 and 
other regional groupings. The CMIM (or other RFA) would have to decide its own classification 
scheme for its member countries. 
Jeanne (2010) proposes a two-tier system in which the regional RFA lends up to a certain 
extent, which can be increased by IMF lending associated with more demanding conditionality. 
This model might make sense if regional conditionality is politically more acceptable than IMF 
conditionality. On the other hand, if the crisis called for more funding that the RFA could provide, 
then agreement on conditionality with the IMF would need to be reached. Also, as described 
below, central bank swap lines and lending by multilateral banks also should be included, 
making the structure more complex. 
This raises further issues regarding IMF conditionality. Currently, the CMIM requires a member 
to have an IMF program if it borrows more than 20% of its quota. However, recent and proposed 
IMF financing innovations raise the issue of what constitutes an IMF program  and  whether 
precautionary loans should be included. Henning and Khan (2011) propose that the ASEAN+3 
members  accept qualification for IMF’s FCL program as the equivalent of a traditional IMF 
program, thereby allowing qualifying countries to access more than 20% of their quota. This 
would be consistent with the two kinds of liquidity crises identified in Section 2.2 above. Of 
course, if the IMF conditionality is dropped altogether, this point becomes moot. 
Another issue is whether the IMF could lend to the CMIM or other RFAs. Currently, it can only 
lend to countries. If it could lend to the CMIM, this again might ease the stigma problem, 
assuming that the conditionality issues could be worked out. 
Holding reserves is costly and inefficient. ADB and IIE (2011) and Fernández-Arias and Levy-
Yeyati (2010), among others, note that, since central banks like the Fed can print unlimited 
quantities of reserve currencies on short notice, they should occupy a prominent place in 
discussions of global financial safety net arrangements. The problem is that central banks are 
reluctant to make blanket or advance guarantees to supply liquidity, both on domestic political 
grounds and as a result of concerns about possible moral hazard and the risk of not being 
repaid. Nonetheless, efforts should be made to explore ways to involve key central banks in the 
development of a global financial safety net and to identify the conditions under which their 
participation in a GFSN could be institutionalized. As noted above, the IMF’s own GSM plan 
envisions it acting as a broker on the part of central banks, but this is by no means the only 
possible organizational structure. Indeed, if the CMIM could obtain a swap line from, say, the 
Bank of Japan, this would greatly reduce the need to cooperate with the IMF, except in the case 
of a very large crisis. 
5.  POSSIBLE CHANGES IN COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
This section suggests some general principles and more specific proposals to help promote 
regional and global cooperation in the areas of surveillance and financing activity, in order to 
support the development of more effective financial safety nets.  
5.1  General principles 
The first requirement is greater coordination at the leader and finance minister levels between 
regional and global organizations. Since the IMF now takes its marching orders from the G20, 
regional organizations must make greater efforts to have their views appropriately represented 
at the G20. This must go beyond expecting the regional G20 member countries to represent the ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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views of non-member countries in their region. This immediately raises the question of what the 
relevant regional grouping might be. In the case of Asia, for example, this could either be the 
ASEAN+3 or the East Asia Summit. Similarly, the G20 needs to make explicit allowance for the 
representation of such regional views. This also requires establishment and consolidation of 
various forums for regional finance ministers, central banks and other regulators. The meetings 
of the ASEAN+3 finance ministers and those of the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific 
Central Banks (EMEAP) need to be coordinated more systematically. As described above, the 
establishment of an Asian Financial Stability Dialogue could contribute to this process. 
  A number of institutional innovations need to be made to establish a clear and transparent 
framework for regional and global monetary cooperation, including:  
  RFAs should establish a clear mechanism for their external representation in other forums, 
rather than simply being represented, for example, by their member countries that belong to 
the G20, the IMF, or other forums. 
  The IMF needs to establish mechanisms to communicate with RFAs, multilateral banks, 
and other regional bodies, and should consider extending some form of membership to 
them. 
  IMF governance  needs to be reformed to accommodate the proposed additions and/or 
changes to its membership. 
  The  IMF should have the  capacity to lend to RFAs, rather than only lending directly to 
member countries. 
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the lessons of the European sovereign debt crisis suggest 
that the biggest challenge is to develop cooperation among member countries of an RFA to 
arrive at a policy consensus. Such policy coordination has not yet been tested in, for example, 
the CMIM. 
5.2  Proposals for surveillance 
Cooperation on surveillance activity requires agreement on objectives, delegation of 
responsibilities, sharing of information, and ultimately, agreeing on standards for assessing the 
information and analysis assembled collectively.  As described previously, delegation of 
responsibilities is difficult, because of the sheer size of the IMF’s resources compared with 
those of RFAs and the desirability of avoiding needless duplication of effort. The key question is 
what value-added can an RFA bring to the table. The answer must lie in local knowledge and 
insight, but how to implement this is not clear. This is particularly difficult in a situation where it is 
not practical for the RFA to carry out assessments of financial sectors, as suggested by Takagi 
(2010). A subsidiary question is how the AMRO makes use of the assessments of other regional 
entities, including the EMEAP, ERPD, and ADB.  
Specific steps should be taken to monitor capital flow movements that may have implications for 
systemic risk, and to coordinate the use of macroeconomic, macroprudential, and capital flow 
management tools to minimize spillover effects. Such coordination also requires practical 
innovations. The suggestion by Kawai (2009a) to include RFA members in IMF Article IV 
assessment missions is a step in the right direction. ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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5.3  Coordination proposals for financial safety nets 
As described above, the evolution of the IMF’s lending programs and philosophies, together 
with the still developing nature of some of the RFAs, especially the CMIM with its nascent 
AMRO, coordination must aim at a moving target. Perhaps the biggest moving target is the 
question of what extent the current system should aim to evolve toward becoming an 
“international lender of last resort” that could be counted on to provide financing on a timely 
basis without conditionality. Such a facility would be needed particularly  during a global 
systemic financial crisis. This kind of capability was strongly advocated by the Government of 
Korea at the G20 Seoul Summit of 2010 (SaKong 2010), but this understandably has met strong 
resistance from the IMF and other potential lenders because of concerns about moral hazard in 
the absence of conditionality. Similar proposals have been made by Fernández-Arias and Levy-
Yeyati (2010) and Kawai (2009a). The most practical approach for achieving this is to move 
increasingly toward prequalification. This points to a further systematization of the Article IV 
assessment process to become a kind of certification or rating process that would vary the 
terms of lending according to the rating applied. Such a rating process also points strongly in 
the direction of coordinated assessments by the IMF and RFAs. This could leave little room for 
“independent”  assessments by an RFA. Along with this, RFAs also need to develop 
precautionary credit lines similar to those of the IMF. On the other hand, the experience of the 
European sovereign debt crisis suggests that conditionality is a key part of the surveillance and 
financing process, and should not be lightly abandoned, unless it is determined that structural 
reforms are not necessary. 
Another key question is how to involve central banks in financial safety nets.  This means 
identifying ways to overcome their reluctance to make ex ante commitments to provide funding, 
when they typically desire to maintain the maximum degree of flexibility in deciding when and 
how much to lend to whom. The most practical solution could be to channel such borrowing 
through the most creditworthy borrowers, with appropriate guarantees. This  implies  lending 
either to the IMF or to the RFAs, and using them as a conduit to reach the individual borrowing 
countries. Either the central banks could lend to the IMF and the RFA separately, or they could 
lend only to the IMF, and then the IMF would lend to the RFA. 
Another potential source of funding is easier expansion of SDR allocations. Bénassy-Quéré, 
Pisani-Ferry,  and Yu (2011)  argue that the problem with IMF facilities is that potential 
beneficiaries might remain unsure that they will get access to them in times of need, which 
makes them imperfect substitutes for reserves. New SDR allocations would not have this 
shortcoming, as they would provide countries with SDR reserves that they could exchange for 
reserves denominated in the currency of their choice. As mentioned above, this is already being 
considered by the IMF as part of the GSM facility being considered. Again, however, it may not 
be desirable to eliminate conditionality in some cases. 
Involvement of RFAs and increased automaticity of lending are probably the ways forward to 
reducing the IMF stigma problem. The IMF can still do the heavy lifting in terms of surveillance, 
but involvement of the RFA can make the lending and conditionality more palatable. However, 
some degree of stigma is inevitable if conditionality is still required in some cases. ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The experience of the global financial crisis, where financial shocks emanating from key 
countries led to contagion being transmitted around the world, shows the need for a large-scale 
and effective GFSN. A GFSN should have adequate resources to deal with multiple crises, it 
should be capable of rapid and flexible response, and it should not be encumbered by historical 
impediments such as the  IMF stigma that would limit its acceptance by recipient countries. 
Oversight of the GFSN needs to be based on cooperation between global and regional forums, 
for example the G20 and ASEAN+3 or EAS. 
Such a GFSN should include the IMF and RFAs at a minimum, and it is highly recommended to 
find ways to include central banks as providers of swap lines and multilateral banks as well. The 
basic principles governing the cooperation of IMF and RFAs include rigorous and even-handed 
surveillance; respect of independence and decision-making processes of each institution and 
regional specificities; ongoing collaboration as a way to build regional capacity for crisis 
prevention; open sharing of information and joint missions where necessary; specialization 
based on comparative advantage; consistency of lending conditions and conditionality, although 
with flexibility; respect of the IMF as preferred creditor; subsidiarity; avoidance of moral hazard; 
and transparency. 
Relations between the IMF and RFAs should be institutionalized. This would include having the 
IMF and other IFIs provide mechanisms for facilitating and receiving the collective 
representation of the regional institutions, including possibly including RFAs as members in the 
IMF; and having RFAs establish their own institutions for dealing with the IMF, rather than 
simply being represented by their member countries. However, probably the biggest challenge 
is to institutionalize the process of policy consensus among member countries of an RFA. 
Cooperation of surveillance activities  needs to be institutionalized as well. RFAs should be 
included in IMF Article IV consultation missions, and a general structure for sharing information 
and assessments should be established. The most difficult aspect is to decide the division of 
responsibilities between the IMF and RFAs. For the foreseeable future, most RFAs are unlikely 
to have sufficient resources to provide viable independent alternatives to IMF surveillance, 
especially with regard to financial surveillance. Moreover, the increasing shift to prequalification 
of borrowers means that standardized schemes for classifying the credit-worthiness of 
borrowers will need to be developed, which will further limit the room for independence of RFAs. 
The key issue is how to bring their regional expertise to bear in the assessment process. Most 
likely, the solutions to this issue will need to be developed on a case-by-case basis.  
Cooperation in financing activities probably presents the most challenges. A number of key 
developments need to be taken into account. First, as with surveillance, the relatively small size 
of most RFAs compared with likely funding demands in possible crisis scenarios means that 
action independent from the IMF is unlikely to be feasible.
9
The development of an effective GFSN requires the involvement of central banks to provide 
hard currency swap lines. Linking together these disparate elements is likely to prove difficult in 
light of the desire of central banks’ to maintain maximum flexibility in terms of their 
commitments. The other requirement for an effective GFSN is elimination of the IMF stigma, 
  Second, the shift toward 
prequalification and precautionary lending programs by the IMF requires the RFAs to follow suit 
if they are to participate at this stage of the lending process. Both these trends will limit the 
scope for independent action by RFAs.  
                                                 
9 The European Commission is probably the major exception to this. ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
 
 
  24 
particularly in Asia and Latin America, where it is strong. Otherwise, countries in those regions 
will still prefer alternative arrangements, such as directly obtaining swap lines from central 
banks. The IMF needs to implement reforms of its governance and mission, and make a 
thorough and open assessment of its previous surveillance and conditionality activities. RFAs 
need to obtain sufficient resources to give them credibility in terms of the surveillance activity 
and the size of funding they can provide relative to the IMF. Expanded and more flexible 
capacity for additional SDR allocations need to be considered. Finally, a reduction in 
conditionality  that requires a shift toward prequalification, needs to be considered. In cases 
where countries are “innocent bystanders” in global systemic events, conditionality should be 
dropped completely, but it needs to be retained in the case of inappropriate policies. 
Distinguishing between these two ex ante and ex post is likely to prove a major challenge. ADBI Working Paper 346    Lamberte and Morgan 
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